The Protophenomenal Concepts Strategy

Dr Jonathan Simon (Australian National University)

Abstract: The Fundamental Scrutability argument for Property Dualism (a close relative of the Knowledge Argument) begins with the premise that all of the facts follow a priori from the fundamental facts. It continues with the observation that the phenomenal facts do not follow a priori from the physical facts, and from this concludes that the physical facts do not exhaust the fundamental facts.

One underexplored pattern of response to this argument is the Protophenomenal Concept strategy. On this strategy, we concede that although the phenomenal facts do not follow from any ordinary (structural-dynamic) presentation of the physical facts, there are nevertheless other extraordinary, protophenomenal presentations of the physical facts from which the phenomenal facts do indeed follow. Here, I consider the prospects for this strategy. I conclude that, though it is coherent (and suggests a way of reviving debates in pre-socratic metaphysics from the comfort of our scientific materialist living rooms), its costs outweigh its benefits. Time permitting, I show how this secures a loose end in my argument, presented elsewhere, that the concept 'consciousness' is not vague.