Idealism Operationalized: Charles Peirce's Theory of Perception

Dr. Catherine Legg (Deakin University )

Neopragmatism has been accused of having ‘an experience problem’. This paper begins by outlining Hume's understanding of perception according to which ideas are copies of impressions thought to constitute a direct confrontation with reality. This understanding is contrasted with Peirce's theory of perception according to which percepts give rise to perceptual judgments which do not copy but index the percept (just as a weather-cock indicates the direction of the wind). Percept and perceptual judgment thereby mutually inform and correct one another, as the perceiver develops mental habits of interpreting their surroundings, so that, in this theory of perception, as Peirce puts it: “[n]othing at all…is absolutely confrontational”. Paul Redding has argued that Hegel’s “idealist understanding of logical form” ran deeper than Kant’s in recognising that Mind is essentially embodied and located, and therefore perspectival. Peirce’s understanding arguably dives deeper still in distributing across the space of reasons (and thus Being) not just Mind’s characteristic features of embodiedness and locatedness, but also its infinite corrigibility.

Bio:

Catherine Legg holds a BA (Hons) from University of Melbourne, an MA from Monash University and a PhD from Australian National University. Initially trained in analytical philosophy, she developed a strong interest in American pragmatism, particularly Charles Peirce. Her 1999 PhD thesis (Modes of Being) concerned Peirce’s three fundamental philosophical categories. Afterwards Cathy taught briefly at University of Melbourne, moved to Texas and engaged in a spell of ‘ontological engineering’, then moved back downunder to teach Philosophy at the University of Waikato for a number of years. She has just joined the Deakin University Philosophy Program as a Senior Lecturer.

Her current research bridges ontology, philosophy of language, semiotics, logic, and AI. Peirce’s notion of iconicity has been a particular focus, with key papers: “The Problem of the Essential Icon” (American Philosophical Quarterly, 2008) and “The Hardness of the Iconic Must” (Philosophia Mathematica, 2012).