Ramsey and the Vienna Circle: Not What You Think

Cheryl Misak (University of Toronto)

The received view is that Ramsey was signed up to the logical analyst program of the early Russell, the early Wittgenstein, and the Vienna Circle. I shall explore Ramsey's connections with the Vienna Circle and show that he was not on board with their project. He did not identify a primary language of observation and logic and then go on to argue that open generalisations and lawlike statements can be given a different, pragmatist, treatment. Rather, he started from a pragmatist account of belief as a habit of behaviour and came to a global pragmatist account of belief and its evaluation. I will also suggest that Ramsey convinced Wittgenstein to turn his back on his early position and converted him to pragmatism, although he wouldn't have been happy with what Wittgenstein then did with it.