Reflections on Paraconsistency

June 21, 2018 - June 26, 2018
LIMOS, CNRS, Université Clermont Auvergne

Campus Albert Londres
1 Avenue des Célestins
Vichy 03200

This will be an accessible event, including organized related activities

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Keynote speakers:

Bradley Armour-Garb
University of Albany, SUNY, USA
Jonas Becker
UFSC, Florianópolis, Brazil
Roy Sorensen
Washington University in St. Louis
Maria del Rosario
UNAM, Mexico, City, Mexico


Franca D'Agostini
State University of Milan
Elena Ficara
Paderborn University

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Paraconsistent logics form a lively sector of the discipline we call Philosophical Logic. The idea that contradictions are – in some cases or in some way – acceptable without «explosion» of our rational systems has been developed by paraconsistent logicians also with reference to epistemological and metaphysical implications, and there is a wide literature on the theme. However, the arising of contradictions, and the need of coming to terms with them, has also ethical, political and more generally practical implications that sometimes fade into the background.  Not only that, one of the main problem of paraconsistency (but this is true also of other fields, such as modal logic) is that on the one hand there are philosophically oriented works with a weak or non technical part and, on the other, some technical paraconsistent works have no consideration for the philosophical aspects of the theme. One aim of our workshop is to promote interaction between technical and non-technical works in the field. A second but not secondary aim is to enlarge the view, involving people interested in contradictions, but not exclusively as militant logicians.  

We thus encourage contributions able to suggest and treat preliminary questions, sometimes underrated or not extensively studied by logicians, such as,  

1 - In metaphysical and truth-theoretic perspective: - If the acceptance of contradictions is ruled by truth (as dialetheists hold), can we really renounce the classical exclusive notion of ‘T’, in virtue of which if ‘p’ is true then ‘not p’ must be false?

2 - In epistemological perspective: - Do we really believe the unbelievable?  - What kinds of epistemic gluts are rationally acceptable?

3 - In ethical and generally practical perspective: - Disagreements and dilemmas are typical contexts in which the occurring of contradictions has political consequences: how can we use the theories of paraconsistent logicians to deal with these occurrences?

4- In meta-theoretical perspective: - Why do we study contradictions? What normative conclusions can be drawn from our theoretical efforts on this issue? - What can we learn from the history of paraconsistency?  

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November 1, 2017, 11:45pm CET

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