Climate change and individual obligations

Brian Berkey (Nossal Institute, University of Melbourne)

Abstract: Although it is generally agreed that action ought to be taken at the collective level to mitigate the bad effects of climate change, several philosophers have argued that individuals cannot be obligated to reduce their own emissions, since individual actions such as taking a drive in an SUV are certain to make no difference to the extent of the relevant bad effects. Those who make this argument typically believe that individuals are, however, obligated to engage in political action aimed at getting effective mitigation policies adopted. Others have argued that individuals are obligated to reduce their emissions, even though such reductions will make no morally relevant difference. In this talk I'll argue that the view that individuals are obligated to engage in political action, but not to reduce their own emissions, cannot be defended, and that views on which individuals are obligated to reduce their emissions even if doing so is certain to make no morally relevant difference have trouble making sense of the idea that our mitigation obligations are owed to future generations. I'll suggest that a successful defense of the claim that individuals have any mitigation obligations, and therefore of the claim that there is a collective mitigation obligation, may depend on an argument for the view that individual actions can make a morally relevant difference. Drawing on an argument developed by Shelly Kagan, I'll outline such an argument, and suggest some reasons to think that it can be defended.

Building location: http://maps.unimelb.edu.au/parkville/building/148