New work for a theory of intentionality
Alexander Sandgren (Australian National University)

June 1, 2018, 11:00am - 1:00pm
Logic Group, The University of Melbourne

Old Quad
Parkville 3010


University of Melbourne

Topic areas


Alex Sandgren (ANU) will present "New work for a theory of intentionality" on 1 June at 11 in Old Quad G10.

Abstract: My goal in this paper is to make progress toward a unified theory of intentionality that does not fall prey to either of the most serious species of puzzles facing any theory of intentionality; indeterminacy puzzles (e.g. modal-theoretic arguments, the qua problem, rule-following problems) and puzzles concerning thought and talk directed at things that, prima facie, do not exist (e.g. empty names). Much attention has been payed to these two types of puzzles separately, but it is fruitful to consider how a theory of intentionality could simultaneously handle both sorts of puzzles, since many of the resources appealed to in solving puzzles of one kind often do not help (and sometimes hinder) our efforts to solve puzzles of the other kind, or so I will argue. I will then propose a novel account of intentionality that can handle both kinds of puzzles. The central idea is to reduce intentionality (the relation supposed to stand between thoughts and linguistic items, and their objects) to relations of intentional identity (the relation of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts and linguistic items themselves).

Supporting material

Add supporting material (slides, programs, etc.)




Who is attending?

No one has said they will attend yet.

Will you attend this event?

Let us know so we can notify you of any change of plan.

This event has been submitted and is maintained by:

(University of Melbourne)

You should login and contact this user if you believe the information on this page needs updating.

If you judge that this event entry is inappropriate, please login and report it.