Modalism and the Plurality of Logics Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)
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Abstract: In this paper I provide a defense of modalism, the view according to which primitive modality is needed in philosophical theorizing. After distinguishing among various forms of modalism and specifying the metaphysically deflationary version I favor, I consider a number of arguments against modalism, respond to them, and offer a series of arguments for the view. I then consider logical pluralism, the view according to which there is a plurality of logics, several of which are adequate to any given domain. I then consider a number of arguments against logical pluralism, respond to them, and provide several arguments in support of the view. Since modalism plays a key role in these latter arguments, I conclude that the combination of both modalism and logical pluralism provides an attractive, integrated view.
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