Explanation without essence?

Like causation and composition, essence appears to be an explanatory notion. For example, why might it be necessary for ordinary table salt to contain chlorine but not necessary for chlorine to constitute ordinary table salt? Answer: it is part of what it is to be salt—part of its very essence—that it consist of chlorine, but not part of what it is to be chlorine to constitute salt.

Philosophers who oppose essentialist thinking have suggested that the notion of essence is theoretically obstructive, practically harmful, or both. For example, in discussions about race and gender, important contributions have been made highlighting the negative sociopolitical consequences of essentialist thinking. And these anti-essentialist critiques aren’t restricted to social phenomena. They target the application of essentialist thought to the “natural” world, as well, for they suggest that claims about essence are really a product of prejudicial thinking across the board. The world is too complex—there’s simply too much variation—for things to be neatly defined.

Philosophy has seen a renewed interest in the notion of essence, both as a target of critique and as a tool for theorizing. This workshop seeks to bring together theorists from both of these outlooks to assess the current state of debate. Is it possible to reconcile these two approaches, and if so, what are the different conceptions of essence at issue in each? If they cannot be reconciled, can we engineer a new concept that does the work we would like essence to do without incurring any of the theoretical and practical disadvantages of essentialist thinking?