On Experience in Feyerabend’s PhilosophyDeivide Garcia da Silva Oliveira (Federal University of Reconcavo of Bahia)
1117 Cathedral of Learning
Pittsburgh 15260
United States
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Abstract: The use of experience as a source of discovery and justification is, and perhaps always will be, a problem for both scientific knowledge and for knowledge in general. Traditionally, it has been assumed that metaphysical knowledge has no legitimate role to play in justifying knowledge based on experience. Accordingly, since scientific justification is assumed to be empirical, there is no place for metaphysics in science. Consequently, these sorts of assumptions, that “experience can be regarded as a true source and foundation of knowledge” (Feyerabend, 1969, 132), entail that metaphysical knowledge cannot provide justification for our beliefs about the world. On the other hand, according to Feyerabend in some articles and books, such as Science without Experience (1969), Knowledge without foundations (1961) and How to be a good Empiricist: a plea for tolerance in matters epistemological (1963), metaphysics is, and ought to be, an indispensable part of modern science. Otherwise, the progress of knowledge would be compromised. This subject raises the following research questions: what does Feyerabend mean by experience? Is there some difference between the first (before 1970) and the later (after 1970) Feyerabend about the notion of experience? Is Feyerabend’s philosophy defending scientific knowledge under a radical relativism approach, i.e., that we cannot have justification for our knowledge? What role can Feyerabend’s notion of experience play in scientific knowledge? Could we develop a conception of experience that differs from Modern Empiricists’? Motivated by these questions, the aim of this research is to clarify and analyze the notion of experience in Feyerabend’s philosophy and its implications for scientific knowledge. To do this, I will argue that one should distinguish two phases in his work (before and after 1970) and that this distinction matters for understanding experience in Feyerabend’s philosophy. We will investigate the main texts written by Feyerabend about experience from the 1960s until the 1990s as well as Against Method (1993).
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