Language, logic and shrieking: blunting some Scharp objections

Jc Beall (University of Connecticut, University of Tasmania)

Jc Beall (UConn) will present "Language, logic and shrieking: blunting some Scharp objections" at 11 in Old Quad G10 on 9 November.

Abstract: In `Shrieking against gluts' (Analysis 2013) I claim that the infamous problem of `just true' for glut theorists is to explain how glut theorists accommodate the common notion of \emph{just true theories}. My answer in said paper is that the given notion involves neither a new notion of truth nor some new negation-like device; rather, just-true theories are simply true theories of a certain sort — namely, so-called shrieked theories. In his `Shrieking in the face of vengeance’ Kevin Scharp (Analysis 2018) objects that, when explicitly extended to cover sentences and not just theories, the shrieked account has at least two devastating problems: namely, it changes the subject, and it gives a untenable account of the logical form of sentences in our ordinary language. In the current paper I reply to Scharp’s objections.