The Possibility of Metaphysics: Between Inductive, Analytic, and Transcendental Arguments

In the last century, metaphysics in the traditional sense became subject of radical scepticism. One strategy to save metaphysics from sceptical doubts is bringing metaphysical investigation closer to scientific practice. This workshop is intended to explore the Kantian question whether metaphysics is possible as a “science”, and if so, whether it can or should be conducted on the basis of scientific methods and findings or whether it can still be justified as an aprioristic enterprise. A Kantian strategy to counter scepticism is the use of transcendental arguments. Questions of particular interest are – among others – the following ones: How can metaphysics be justified? Is metaphysics an aprioristic discipline or should it be pursued on the basis of scientific findings or argumentative methods used in the sciences such as induction and abduction? How do transcendental arguments relate to inferences made in the sciences? What is their relevance for modern metaphysical approaches such as naturalised metaphysics or the Canberra plan? Which role do empirical data and empirical methods play in contemporary metaphysics and can their use in metaphysics be justified?