The Objectivity of Moral Judgement

The moral goodness of an action is evidently nothing of the kind of a natural property or feature, to which a moral judgement corresponds if it is correct. Even the denial of moral objectivity requires a model of what it could plausibly be taken to consist in. It seems inevitable that such a model will have to accord a special, "constitutive", role to the subject of moral judgement, so that any plausible solution to the problem will, in any case, differ markedly from an account of empirical objectivity. In this small workshop, we will concern ourselves with this fundamental problem and give special prominence to Kant's ethical thought and its critics. The workshop, hosted by the Klagenfurt Institute of Philosophy, is part of an interdisciplinary cooperation project entitled THE EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD, supported by HRSM funding from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy.