Modality in Structural/Naturalist Ontologies

A major school of thought that has significant bearings on scientific realism debate is known as structuralism, which, broadly speaking, takes structures as prior to or more significant than objects and their intrinsic qualities. Since the early years of the structuralism debate, modality has occupied a central place in the literature. It has been argued that the structure under scrutiny here is the objective modal structure of the world. Some suggested that such an understanding of modal structure is the most convenient locus for a plausible version of naturalized metaphysics. On this very relation between modality and naturalistic involvement, some others have proposed that the strength of a naturalized metaphysics is determined by how modality is assessed: the stronger natural necessities are, the more naturalistic the metaphysics is. However, such an understanding is at odds with some current naturalistic projects such as Super-Humeanism since modality does not appear at the very fundamental level of reality. Despite the differences between these several structural and naturalist ontologies, modality has nonetheless become a very salient topic in the current research. 

The participants at the conference will attempt to address methodological and specific questions on the relation between scientific modality and naturalized metaphysics. Some of these questions include: What is the exact relation between scientific modality and naturalistic involvement? If a metaphysical position excludes natural necessities at the most fundamental level of reality, is there any possibility for this position to be naturalistic? Is there any place for structural modalities in laws of nature debate? How is modality assessed in different interpretations of quantum mechanics, and which interpretation is the best for a plausible version of naturalized metaphysics?