CFP: Scientific Explanations, Competing and Conjunctive
Submission deadline: March 31, 2019
June 26, 2019 - June 28, 2019
Department of Philosophy, University of Utah
Salt Lake City, United States
Scientific Explanations, Competing and Conjunctive
University of Utah; Salt Lake City, Utah, USA; June 26-28, 2019
Conference website: https://www.conjunctive-explanations.org/secc.html
EasyChair site: https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=secc19
- Igor Douven, French National Centre for Scientific Research
- Stephan Hartmann, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
- Leah Henderson, University of Groningen
- Lauren Ross, University of California, Irvine
- Tomoji Shogenji, Rhode Island College
Conference Topics and Overview
In research on the nature of scientific explanation, philosophers argue that the same explanandum may have associated with it a multiplicity of explanantia. This claim is most plausible perhaps when it comes to cases of so-called explanatory pluralism, cases in which numerous explanations each do qualitatively different explanatory work. An object’s existence can be explained either by referring to its causes or its function. One hypothesis may explain an event by telling us a causal-mechanical story leading up to the event, while another may perhaps explain the same event by referring to a nomic regularity that the event instantiates. Cases of such "explanatory multiplicity" are often used to defend a general pluralism regarding the nature of scientific explanation.
Such views on the nature of explanation seem to be in tension with a common feature of models of explanatory reasoning in philosophy of science, computer science, and cognitive science: the assumption that when we reason explanatorily, we reason between competing explanations. Explanatory forms of scientific reasoning such as Inference to the Best Explanation (or abductive inference) and Explaining-Away are often cast as applying only to competing hypotheses. But if explanatory multiplicity is truly a common phenomenon in the sciences, then why should our models of scientific, explanatory reasoning only compare potential explanations that compete? Indeed, in cases of explanatory multiplicity, it would seem desirable for such models not only to allow us to compare non-competing explanations but also to guide us in inferring them conjointly as "conjunctive explanations".
This conference will be a three-day exploration of these and related issues. Submissions are especially welcome on the nature and/or epistemology of scientific explanation, including work involving computer simulations. Questions of specific interest that such papers might address include the following:
- What is a scientific explanation, and is there one true account? What reasons may be given for or against explanatory multiplicity and/or explanatory pluralism in the sciences?
- What distinguishes explanations? When is it appropriate to say that two explanations are actually one and the same (or part of the same) versus distinct?
- How should explanatory multiplicity be accounted for in models of scientific explanation? Do Inference to the Best Explanation, Explaining-Away, and other formal models of scientific reasoning essentially compare competing hypotheses, or can they be stated in terms of conjunctive explanations?
- Under what epistemic conditions do distinct explanations constitute conjunctive (rather than competing) explanations? What does it mean for explanatory hypotheses to compete?
- How can computer simulations of scientific reasoning shed light on the role of explanation? How can conjunctive and competing explanations be modeled in simulations of this kind?
- What historical cases can be given of conjunctive explanations at work in scientific thought? What logical, formal epistemological, philosophical, etc. reasons can be put forward for validating and clarifying the role of conjunctive explanations in scientific practice?
This workshop will be of special interest to philosophers of science (general and specialized), formal epistemologists, computer scientists, cognitive scientists, and historians of scientific thought. But it is open to anyone. Those planning to attend can register by simply dropping an email, including your name and affiliation, to Prof Jonah N. Schupbach (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Submissions / Proceedings / Support
Submissions in the form of extended abstracts are invited on the topics identified above (or related topics relevant to the workshop theme). A blinded, extended abstract of no more than 1,500 words should be submitted via EasyChair https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=secc19> by 31 March, 2019. Decisions will be announced by 30 April, 2019.
Financial support will be available to assist speakers with a portion of their travel/lodging expenses.
Some of the papers presented at this workshop will be published in an edited volume or journal special issue. More details to come.
Link to submission area via EasyChair can be found here.
The conference will be hosted by the University of Utah's Department of Philosophy. All talks will take place in the Carolyn Tanner Irish Humanities Building.
Structure of the Conference
The conference will run for three days, June 26-28. 1.5 hours (45 min paper + 45 min discussion) will be allocated for invited, keynote presentations and 1 hour (30 min paper + 30 min discussion) for contributed papers. Coffee and lunch breaks, as well as a workshop dinner, will provide many opportunities for informal discussions.
Inquiries about the conference should be directed to the local organizer, Prof Jonah N. Schupbach(email@example.com).
Sponsorship and Funding
Funding and support for the conference are provided by the following sources:
- John Templeton Foundation. Grant #61115: “Conjunctive Explanations: How Science and Religion Can Work Together”. This project is a collaboration between the University of Utah, Ulster University, and Queen’s University Belfast.
- Department of Philosophy, University of Utah. Annual Conference Series.
- Tanner Humanities Center, University of Utah.