The Comforting Delusion Objection and the Mechanisms of Psychedelic Therapy
Chris Letheby (University of Western Australia)

August 30, 2019, 10:30am - 12:00pm
School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University

Menzies Building, fifth floor, Room E561
20 Chancellor's Walk
Clayton, Melbourne 3800
Australia

Organisers:

Monash University

Details

Abstract: Psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy is making waves in psychiatry. A growing body of evidence suggests that one or two doses of LSD and psilocybin, administered in controlled conditions, can reduce symptoms of anxiety, depression, and addiction for many months. A philosophical concern arises from the fact that beneficial outcomes appear to be mediated by drug-induced “mystical-type experiences” of cosmic consciousness. Those sympathetic to a physicalist or naturalist worldview may worry, as Michael Pollan put it, that psychedelic therapy is “simply foisting a comforting delusion on the sick and dying”.

Extant responses to this “Comforting Delusion Objection” include: (i) holding that the cosmic consciousness is real, and so the psychedelic mystical experience is veridical (Richards 2015); (ii) arguing that the epistemic status of the psychedelic experience is less important, in the final analysis, than whether it improves patients’ quality of life (Flanagan and Graham 2017); and (iii) arguing that the epistemic flaws of psychedelic therapy, while real, are counterbalanced by significant epistemic benefits (Letheby 2016). However, none of these responses directly addresses the empirical claim at the heart of the Objection: that the induction of non-naturalistic metaphysical beliefs is the central mechanism whereby psychedelics improve psychosocial functioning.

In this talk I argue against this claim. Qualitative studies of psychedelic therapy suggest that not all patients who satisfy psychometric criteria for a mystical-type experience actually have idealistic experiences as of cosmic consciousness. Some, instead, describe experiences of acceptance, connectedness, embodiment, and “resetting the brain”. Therefore, idealistic experiences and beliefs cannot be the central mechanism of change. However, this does not mean that psychedelic therapy is a pharmacotherapy operating by a non-experiential molecular mechanism. I describe recent theoretical work suggesting that psychedelics induce mystical-type experiences, and bring about therapeutic benefits, by weakening high-level beliefs about self and world that structure ordinary experience. Along the way, I draw out some testable predictions of my account, which provides a case study of productive interaction between philosophy and the mind/brain sciences.

Supporting material

Add supporting material (slides, programs, etc.)

Reminders

Registration

No

Who is attending?

No one has said they will attend yet.

Will you attend this event?


Let us know so we can notify you of any change of plan.