On Dynamical Laws as Guides to What is Fundamental

Vera Matarese (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)

Abstract:  Are we entitled to read off our fundamental ontology from our dynamical laws? Normally two different replies can be found in the literature. North (2013), for instance, answers in the affirmative. According to her, dynamical laws relate what is fundamental to what is fundamental and we should posit, in the fundamental world, whatever makes the dynamical laws true. Her view is even committed to term-objectivism, according to which equivalent but different mathematical formulas depict different fundamental structures of the physical world (North 2009). In contrast, Esfeld (2018) answers in the negative by claiming that dynamical laws do not wear their ontology on their sleeves and their predicates are only nomological parameters, devoid of any ontological significance.  In my talk I will concede that—as illustrated in Shaffer & Hicks (2107)—dynamical laws do not always use joint-carving predicates. However, I will argue that they should still be regarded as guides to what is fundamental and I shall show possible ways in which they may actually guide us. Finally, I will discuss a thesis proposed by Curiel (Ms.), which does seriously challenge my view: that it is the kinematics, and not the dynamics, that plays a role in revealing the fundamental structure of the physical world.