Second International Workshop Inferences and Proofs 2

Why and how do valid inferences have the power to compel us to accept their conclusion, once their premisses are accepted as justified? What is the source of such a transmission of justification? Where does this epistemic power stem from? And, last but not least, how should we formally account for this fundamental phenomenon? Logic deals with these questions at least since Aristotle's well-known definition of a syllogism as a discourse in which, certain things being laid down, something follows of necessity from them. In recent years, however, various constructivist approaches, originating from the intuitionistic tradition, from proof-theory and from Dummett's investigations into theories of meaning, seem to have shed a new light upon the issue. In this framework, we cannot fail to mention Jean-Yves Girard's, Per Martin-Löf's and Dag Prawitz's essential contributions. This workshop follows the one titled Inferences and Proofs, held in Marseille from May 31 to June 1st 2016 - that in turn yielded the Inferences and Proofs special issue of TOPOI guest-edited by the organisers Gabriella Crocco and Antonio Piccolomini d'Aragona. Raising more or less the same questions as its predecessor, Inferences and Proofs 2 is nonetheless enriched by the results and advancements achieved during the last three years.