CFP: Meta-theories of disagreement - special issue

Various forms of disagreement are ubiquitous in all fields of discussion, such as values, science, philosophy, politics and aesthetics. The theoretical understanding of many forms of disagreement (such as faultless disagreement, reasonable disagreement etc.) relies on different epistemological, semantic and metaphysical considerations. Studies on disagreement have profound implications on the nature of truth, normativity and objectivity. Given the complexity of these interrelated problems and their manifold implications on various fields of philosophical inquiry, we need to reflect on how general conceptual frameworks, such as accounts of realism and anti-realism on certain domains, various forms of relativism and scepticism, as well as cognitivism and non-cognitivism on normativity could help us get a better insight on the fundamental problems in disagreement and initiate future discussions.

We invite papers discussing theoretical frameworks that are useful to understand the phenomena of disagreements in general.

In case you are interested in contributing, please send your manuscipt to Metaphilosophy ([email protected]) no later than 2nd of May, 2020, 23:59 (CET).

Please add to the subject line: 'Special issue: Meta-theories of Disagreement Manuscript'.