Reasons: Action, Belief, Perception

The aim of the conference is to bridge the gap between reasons in action theory/ethics and reasons in epistemology, particularly with respect to the distinction between motivating and normative reasons. Main questions are: What do reasons for actions and reasons for belief have in common? Are reasons of both kinds normative or motivating or explanatory in the same sense? What can be learned from reasons of the one kind for understanding reasons of the other kind, for example with respect to their ontology? Are reasons of both kinds facts, states of affairs, or propositions? If there are normative reasons for belief, are they evidence, truth-makers, mental states, or their contents? Can our understanding of reasons for belief be improved by transferring the conceptual apparatus of action theory to epistemology (or the other way around)? Could distinctions from action theory be fruitfully put to work in the debate between intentionalism and disjunctivism in the epistemology of perception?