Theory and Anti-Theory in Ethics

A One-Day Workshop on Philosophy and the Nature of Morality
 
It is widely assumed by philosophers that morality stands in need of theoretical systematisation, epistemic justification and metaphysical foundations. Debates in normative ethics are typically a shoot out between Kantianism, consequentialism and virtue ethics, each claiming the best theorisation of morality on these three scores. An upshot is that even very basic moral views can be made hostage to the outcome of theoretical inquiries. Some of the most important convictions of people’s lives (for example that the life of a severely handicapped child is more important than that of a dog, or that it would be doing a grave wrong to the child to kill it) are thus cast in a speculative mode as ‘intuitions’, making them vulnerable to theoretical inquiry. These debates also usually assume, inter alia that morality is naturalistic in the sense of being based in some way on pre-moral interests like sentience, desire, rational autonomy and flourishing; that judgments are universalizable in the sense that if two agents are in the same ‘morally relevant circumstances’ they enjoy the same permissions and are subject to the same obligations; that particular moral judgments should be codified in a system of general principles; that the only significant form of moral responsibility is that for an agent’s free and deliberate actions; and that morality is sovereign over other forms of value.
 
But some traditions have sought to challenge the above picture of morality in various of the respects mentioned. Wittgensteinians like Cora Diamond and Raimond Gaita have attacked naturalism by defending a sense of human fellowship that is not reducible to naturalizable features like sentience, rationality, etc. Platonists like Iris Murdoch, R F Holland and, again, Gaita have defended a form of absolute, non-naturalizable goodness. Bernard Williams has denied that responsibility attaches exclusively to free, deliberate actions, and, famously, has also contested morality’s claim to be sovereign over all serious value. Peter Winch and David Wiggins have challenged the doctrine of universalizability. And particularists like Jonathan Dancy have questioned the assumption that morality can or should be regimented into principles. Nearly all of these authors reject the idea that morality must be subject to some general theoretical and impartial justification, on pain of irrationality. Philosophers sympathetic to some or all of these challenges are among those sometimes called ‘anti-theorists’.
 
The papers at this workshop will debate these and other issues that divide theorists and anti-theorists in a format that will provide the opportunity for detailed discussion. On the Monday there will be four speakers, allocated to time slots of an hour and a half each, allowing 45 minutes for paper presentation and 45 minutes for discussion. Then on Tuesday there will be a day-long ‘discussion session’ where the speakers and attendees will pursue the themes from the previous day in a relaxed, unstructured format that allows for intensive discussion. The Tuesday event will be led by Associate Professor Christopher Cordner from the University of Melbourne.
 
Speakers for Day 1
 
Joe Mintoff is a senior lecturer and head of the philosophy department at the University of Newcastle, Australia, having received his doctorate from the Australian National University. His research interests are in moral philosophy, specifically the theory of rational choice, moral epistemology, and ancient approaches to the question of how to live. His previous work has focused on the articulation and defense of a unified general solution to the well-known paradoxes of rationality. His more recent work is motivated by the Socratic slogan that the unexamined life is not worth living, and examines the relationship between moral theorising and justified ethical belief. His articles have appeared in American Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, and Ethics.
 
Garrett Cullity is the Hughes Professor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide. He taught for several years at the University of St Andrew’s after completing his doctorate at Oxford under the supervision of Derek Parfit. He joined the philosophy department at Adelaide in 2001. He is the author of The Moral Demands of Affluence (Clarendon Press, 2004) and is now writing a second book defending a form of ethical pluralism. He has published many papers in ethics and practical reasoning. He is the current president of the Australasian Association of Philosophy and is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities.
 
Craig Taylor is senior lecturer and head of the department of philosophy at the Flinders University of South Australia. He completed a doctorate at King’s College in the University of London under the supervision of Professor Raimond Gaita, before teaching philosophy at the University of Stirling in Scotland and Louisiana State University in the US. He joined the department at Flinders in 2005. He is the author of Sympathy: A Philosophical Analysis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) and Moralism: A Study of a Vice (Acumen, 2012) and numerous papers in ethics and moral psychology. He is now working on a book on the nature of ethical thought.
 
Andrew Gleeson is a lecturer in philosophy at Flinders University. He has previously taught philosophy at the University of Adelaide and the Australian Catholic University. His doctorate, in the philosophy of mind, is from the Australian National University. He spent two years as a post-doctoral fellow at Rhodes University in South Africa, where he retains strong connections. He has published papers in ethics, philosophy of mind and philosophy of religion. His book A Frightening Love: Recasting the Problem of Evil was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2012. His current project is an investigation of the relations between morality and religion,
 
Discussion Leader for Day 2
 
Christopher Cordner is associate professor in, and a former convenor of, the philosophy department at the University of Melbourne. He originally studied philosophy at Melbourne University and then at Oxford University where he completed his doctorate. He has published many papers in ethics and is author of the book Ethical Encounter: the Depth of Moral Meaning (Palgrave Macmillan 2002). He has a strong interest in ancient Greek philosophy, especially Plato. He is working on another book in ethics, provisionally entitled Simple Goodness.
 
Titles and abstracts of papers, venue details, and a precise time-table, will be announced closer to the event.
 
Everyone is welcome to attend both days of the workshop. But please advise us of your intention to attend, and whether for one day or both. There is no registration fee. There will be a workshop dinner on the Monday night. Accommodation may be available at the university’s undergraduate residences, University Hall and Deirdre Jordan Village.
 
Please direct all inquiries, and all expressions of intention to attend, to Dr Andrew Gleeson at [email protected] or (after 7 February) on (08) 8201 7968.