CFP: "New Work on Disagreement", Topical Collection of Synthese

NEW WORK ON DISAGREEMENT

Topical Collection of Synthese

Guest Editors: Dan Zeman (University of Warsaw) and Mihai Hîncu (Valahia University of Târgoviște)

Topical Collection Description:

Disagreement is ubiquitous in everyday life. Sometimes it has negative effects, as when it is conducive to unresolved confrontation; sometimes it has positive effects, as when it brings about beneficial change. People disagree about many things and in many ways, too. Given our many worldviews and many aims in life, disagreement – with both its positive and negative aspect – seems unavoidable.

In philosophy, disagreement has been appealed to in order to support arguments against or in favor of various views pertaining to a large variety of research areas: philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics and metametaphysics, ethics and metaethics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of law and jurisprudence, philosophy of religion etc. Although a lot has been written on the topic, the debates surrounding it have not lost their vivacity and several avenues of research are open at the moment, within and across the various areas of investigation mentioned above. We see the present Topical Collection as furthering the study of disagreement by focusing on several nascent directions that the current debates on disagreement seem to have led to, such as the usefulness, legitimacy and exact form of a notion of “minimal/basic” disagreement, its connections with more substantial notions of disagreement present in the literature, the viability of pluralism about disagreement, arguments for monism or for pluralism in various areas etc. In addition, we welcome contributions that propose new ways of understanding disagreement, both in general and in relation to specific areas of investigation and domains of discourse, and compare them with extant views.

Appropriate Topics for Submission include, among others:

- What is the role, if any, disagreement should play in philosophy in general or in specific areas/domains?

- Is a notion of minimal/basic disagreement desirable, either in philosophy in general or in specific areas/domains?

- If so, what form would such a notion take and what theoretical aims could it help accomplish?

- What relation should there be between a minimal/basic notion of disagreement and more substantial notions found in various areas of philosophy?

- Is pluralism about disagreement more desirable than monism? Why or why not?

- What role could a notion of minimal/basic disagreement play in a pluralist view?

For further information, please contact the guest editors at [email protected] or [email protected].

The deadline for submissions is June 15, 2021.

Submissions via: https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx

Dan Zeman, University of Warsaw, Nowy Świat 69, 00-927 Warsaw, Poland

Mihai Hîncu, Valahia University, Str. Aleea Sinaia, Nr. 13, 130004 Târgoviște, Romania