Causation and Responsibility

Workshop 'Causation and Responsibility'

Causation and responsibility seem to be closely related. Prima facie, agents can be held responsible only for outcomes they caused. What is more, the degree to which agents can be held responsible for the outcomes of their actions seems to depend on how much they causally contributed to them. For instance, if two companies, A and B, jointly cause some environmental damage, their causal contributions may differ: it is possible that company A dumps more toxic waste or emits more greenhouse gases than company B. But then, it seems plausible to conclude that company A is more responsible for the damage resulting from these actions than company B.

It is vividly debated, however, how exactly this relationship is to be understood. Is causation really a necessary condition for responsibility? Is responsibility generally proportionate to causal contribution? And what are the implications of this relationship for metaphysical theories of causation? The aim of this event is to discuss these issues with international experts in the field.

Speakers

Sara Bernstein (Notre Dame)

Mattias Gunnemyr (Lund)

Alex Kaiserman (Oxford)

David Lagnado (London)

Matthias Rolffs (Bern)

Caroline Touborg (Umeå)

Pascale Willemsen (Zürich)

Contact Information

If you would like to join the workshop or if you have any other questions, please do not hesitate to contact Nina Peier ([email protected])

Website

For further information, see www.philosophie.unibe.ch/car2021