Different Moral Kinds of Risks and the Case of Germline Gene Editing as a Source of Risk

Madeleine Hayenhjelm (Umeå University, University College London)

The concept of ‘risk’ is used in multiple, and sometimes in overlapping, ways, all of which can be useful in different contexts. From a moral point of view, the kind of notion we use will impact what we hold fixed and what we can explore. For instance, departing from ‘risk’ understood as probability holds the outcome part relatively fixed but can be used to explore dimensions of responsibility and liability. In the context of emerging and potentially revolutionary kinds of technology, many of the potential outcomes are not yet known and those known we may not be able to assess the probability for. Instead, we might want to hold the source of risk fixed and explore the complexity and plurality of various kinds of possible outcomes. Can such outcomes be sorted and divided into different kinds in ways that are morally informative? Can the kinds of outcomes by themselves give moral guidance on what is wise and unwise to do, on what is more and what is less morally permissible, and on what is more or what is less risky to do from a moral point of view? The debate on germline gene editing provides some interesting examples here of very different kinds of risks that seem to point to very different kinds of moral concerns and to very different kinds of moral advice and different measures on what would be sufficiently cautious.