Two Concepts of Free Will

Joshua May (Monash University)

*** Please note that the room for this seminar is B2.20 ***

A compelling argument seems to show the incompatibility of free will and determinism; yet another seems to show the same for indeterminism. Those of us who have non-skeptical views about free will suspect that something has gone wrong. We offer a diagnosis, on which this is the manifestation of a tension already present in the very idea of free will. For really there is not one key aspect of the concept of free will, but two. We argue that one of these is captured by a certain kind of control (what we call “ensurance”), while the other involves having options (which we dub “liberty”). We provide various lines of support for this hypothesis, including some experimental data gathered by probing the judgments of non-specialists. Contrary to a recent wave of empirical results, we argue that both of these notions are part of the concept of free will, not a mere performance error. This helps to resolve the puzzle regarding determinism, but without casting it as a mere verbal dispute.

Bio: Josh May is Lecturer in Philosophy at Monash University. Most of his research is on moral and epistemic thought, reasoning, and motivation. His most recent articles have appeared in Philosophical Studies, the European Journal of Philosophy, and the Spindel Supplement of the Southern Journal of Philosophy.