CFP: The varieties of anti-skepticism, from past to present

CFP: Topoi Special Issue on “The varieties of anti-skepticism, from past to present”

We are inviting submissions of papers for a special issue of Topoi on the theme of anti-skepticism (~8,000 words), which will be submitted to double-blind peer review process for potential inclusion in the special issue. Further details concerning the special issue and submission process below.

Guest Editors:

Miguel García-Valdecasas, Joseph Milburn, Jean-Baptiste Guillon

Confirmed Contributors:

Anita Avramides (University of Oxford)

Miguel García-Valdecasas (University of Navarra)

John Greco (Georgetown University)

Jean-Baptiste Guillon (University of Navarra)

Dietmar Heidemann (University of Luxemburg)

Joe Milburn (University of Navarra)

Genia Schönbaumsfeld (University of Southampton)

Special Issue Description:

Very rarely has philosophy been unperturbed by the claims of skeptical challenges. From the Stoics’ engagement with the Academics to the present, philosophers have often struggled to produce the kind of arguments that would ideally persuade the skeptics.

Skepticism has historically evolved in its own fashion. Ancient skeptics argued that we should suspend all judgments and live our lives on the basis of appearances or probabilities; modern skeptics held that none of our beliefs are certain, or amount to any knowledge, or are ultimately justified. Likewise, while the ancient skeptics’ doubt is general, modern skepticism limits its critique to a restricted domain of beliefs: the ones about the external world, other minds, or morality. Hume famously claimed that skeptical arguments admit of no answer but produce no conviction; Wittgenstein, that skepticism has been given too much credit for the kind of assumptions on which it relies; Kant complained that philosophers blatantly failed to prove the existence of the external world, and Heidegger, that philosophers relentlessly attempt this proof again and again.

The purpose of this special issue of Topoi is to shed light on the ways in which philosophers have responded to skepticism from the past to the present, in the hope that the variety of anti-skeptical arguments can be reconciled or if not, be justifiably put in order. We welcome both papers that defend a certain strand of anti-skepticism and those critical of anti-skeptical strategies. We welcome approaches from different periods of the history of philosophy and different philosophical traditions (analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, idealism, transcendental philosophy, etc.).

Possible topics and questions include, but are not limited to:

- Can any anti-skeptical argument command universal assent?

- Can the philosophical tradition be brought to agree on the best of them?

- Are those arguments equally solid, and may skepticism benefit from their diverging claims?

- Should anti-skepticism be the default position in epistemology?

- What types of skepticism (if any) are acceptable?  

- What is the truth of skepticism, if there is any?

- What role should anti-skepticism play in epistemology? Is the question of skepticism a central question, or is it peripheral?  

Submission of full papers:

If you wish to have a paper considered for this special edition, a full paper should be submitted by April 30th 2022. Submissions must be suitable for blind review. Each submission should also include a brief abstract of no more than 500 words and four to five keywords for indexing purposes. Publication of accepted papers will first happen digitally as “online first”, presumably by 2022, whereas publication in print is expected in 2023.

All submissions must be made online, here: https://www.editorialmanager.com/topo/

Prospective authors should make sure to select the option “SI Anti-skepticism (García-Valdecasas, Milburn, Guillon)” from the Article Type scroll-down menu.

Please direct any questions and queries to: [email protected]