Two Routes to (and from) Metaphysical Skepticism
Jessica M. Wilson (University of Toronto at Scarborough, University of Toronto, St. George Campus), Claudio Calosi (Université de Genève)

March 15, 2022, 6:00pm - 7:30pm

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Abstract:
I consider and offer replies to lines of thought in support of some form of metaphysical skepticism, according to which metaphysical claims -- e.g., the claim that universals serve as the basis for resemblance between objects, or that sets necessarily exist -- are meaningless, false, epistemically inaccessible, or at best pragmatically accepted.

The Lugano Philosophy Colloquia are a series of events organized by: Master in Philosophy - USI; Ratio - Philosophical Association; Istituto di Studi Filosofici – USI.

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March 14, 2022, 11:00pm CET

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