Rethinking Metaphysics - Misdirections in Metaphysics 2: The Truthmaker Conception of Metaphysics

Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth College)

This is part 2 of a series of three lectures

Abstract

A prominent alternative to the explanatory conception of metaphysics is the ‘Truthmaker’ approach, which sees metaphysics as a descriptive enterprise, aiming to say what (really) exists, or what is fundamental, by determining what features of the world make our true claims true. But this approach, too, relies on a problematic functional monist assumption: that all indicatives aim to describe or represent the world as being certain ways, and demand relevant worldly features to make them true. This assumption leads us into a range of troubles for the truthmaker approach. A better understanding of linguistic functions enables us to diagnose the problems behind the truthmaker conception of metaphysics and why they arose, and can point us in more fruitful directions.