Aptness Isn't Enough: Why We Ought to Abandon Anger

null, Tyler Paytas (Australian Catholic University)

Aptness Isn't Enough: Why We Ought to Abandon Anger Dr Tyler Paytas in the Deakin Philosophy Seminar Series
Abstract
According to the Fittingness Defense, even if anger’s effects are overall bad, it does not follow that we should aim to jettison it. This is because fitting anger involves an accurate appraisal of wrongdoing and is essential for appreciating injustice and signaling our disapproval (Srinivasan 2018; Shoemaker 2018). My aim in this paper is to show that the Fittingness Defense fails. While accurate appraisals are prima facie rational and justified on epistemic grounds, I argue that this type of fittingness is not sufficient for overall vindication because there are alternative modes of recognizing and appreciating wrongdoing that can attain all the positives of anger without the harmful effects. Moreover, anger involves more than its appraisal of wrongdoing—it also consists of attitudes and motivations that are arguably of intrinsic disvalue.

Speaker Bio - Dr Tyler Paytas, Australian Catholic University

My primary research interests are in ethics and the history of philosophy. The three figures I am currently focused on are Plato, Kant, and Sidgwick. One of the overarching goals of my work on these philosophers is to gain a deeper understanding of the differences and similarities between divergent ethical approaches such as eudaimonism, consequentialism, and deontology. Among the specific topics I am interested in is the differing accounts of virtue and value advocated by the great historical champions of these theories. I am currently co-authoring (with Nicholas Baima) a monograph titled Plato’s Pragmatism (Routledge, under contract). The central claim of this book is that, contrary to common opinion, Plato actually prioritizes practical ends (e.g. moral virtue and psychological harmony) above epistemic ends such as knowledge and truth. A second topic I am interested in is the role that impartiality plays within the different ethical theories. I am currently investigating this topic as part of a two-year project on “The Philosophical History of Ethical Impartialism” funded through the Australia-Germany Joint Research Co-operations Scheme (UA/DAAD).