CFP: NCCU Philosophy Journal, Special Issue: Knowledge and Action

Philosophers tend to think that human beings enjoy special capacities for knowledge and action: other animals of course know about directions and distances of foods and predators, but they might lack propositional or conceptual knowledge. Also, other animals are capable of moving for survival, but they might not be able to perform intentional actions. This special issue focusses on human knowledge, action, and related issues/concepts, including beliefs, justification, truth, intentionality, perception, and consciousness. We welcome submissions from all traditions in philosophy. Potential questions suitable for submission include but are not exhausted by the following ones:

-       Do beliefs guide actions? Or does knowledge guide actions? Or both?

-       What is the relation between propositional and conceptual knowledge? Do other animals really lack them?

-       Is the distinction between reflective knowledge and animal knowledge a legitimate one? What are their relations to actions?

-       Is there any difference between intentional and voluntary actions? What are their relations to knowledge?

-       Propositional knowledge might consist in justified true beliefs; what about animal knowledge? What is its distinctive structure?

-       Do knowledge and action relate to each other via intentionality?

-       Is perception a kind of knowledge? What are its relations to propositional and conceptual knowledge? How does perception guide actions?

-       Must reasons be accessed in order to justify? What are the relations between propositional/conceptual knowledge and consciousness?

-       Must intentional actions be conscious? Do varieties of consciousness affect our answers here?

Submission preliminary deadline: Dec. 31st, 2022

Please send submissions to: [email protected]

Please have a separate cover letter detailing author information, and please specify that the manuscript is for SI: Knowledge and Action.