Emotion vs. Principle in Moral JudgmentJoshua May (Monash University)
Philosophy Common Room, Lev 1, Old Quad building
The University of Melbourne
Melbourne 3010
Australia
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Abstract: How should we conceive of moral judgment in light of recent empirical research? Many have suggested a starring role for emotions (e.g. Prinz, Nichols, Haidt). Others, especially proponents of the so-called "linguistic analogy" (e.g. Dwyer, Mikhail, Hauser), have pointed to evidence that moral principles play an important role in moral judgment. One such principle is the Doctrine of Double Effect, which on one formulation states roughly that bringing about a bad outcome is permissible if it is an unintended consequence of intentionally bringing about a good outcome. I shall raise worries for both trends, focusing on the most recent empirical developments, which motivate a more complicated picture. However, I will conclude with some optimism about the rationalist idea that moral principles do sometimes drive moral judgment and that emotions are inessential.
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