A Sense of Free Will - The Phenomenology of Free Will and its Epistemological Significance

Intuitions about free will are linked and in part based on the way it is like for an agent to act - on our common agentive phenomenology. This observation naturally leads to the question about the content of our experience when we experience ourselves as acting freely. Is the content of the experience of acting freely compatible with determinism? Do we have an experience of an open future such that we can choose one out of several alternatives? Do we experience ourselves as agent-causes? Various philosophical and empirical methods have been used to address these issues and the related epistemological questions: Are we justified in believing that these experiences are veridical or do we have reason to think that the relevant experiences are mere illusions? In what way does our experience ground a substantial view of ourselves?
The aim of the workshop is to discuss these questions about the content of agentive phenomenology and related epistemological issues and to examine the way in which they bear on the question of moral responsibility.