CFP: The Motivations for Naive Realism
Submission deadline: October 4, 2013
January 9, 2014 - January 10, 2014
School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, University of Leeds
Leeds, United Kingdom
Call for papers: Workshop on the Motivations for Naïve Realism
January 9-10, 2014
University of Leeds
Confirmed speakers: Alex Byrne, M.G.F. Martin, Susanna Schellenberg
Organisers: Heather Logue, Jason Leddington
Contemporary philosophy of perception is dominated by two views of the nature of perceptual experience: Naïve Realism (also known as the Relational View) and Intentionalism (also known as the Representational View). Recent years have seen a flurry of debate between these camps, but much of it has been a matter of each side merely defending its view from criticisms. Relatively little attention has been paid to the motivations that drive philosophers to one side or the other. Moreover, there is a lack of clarity about how exactly to formulate Naïve Realism, and indeed about what a philosophical theory of perceptual experience is supposed to do. This workshop is part of a larger project intended to fill these gaps.
We invite submissions of papers for presentation at the workshop addressing one or more of the following issues: the motivations for Naïve Realism, the formulation of Naïve Realism, or the goals of philosophical theorising about perceptual experience.
This workshop is funded by a grant from the Mind Association. Unfortunately, we are unable to cover the travel and accommodation expenses for speakers selected via the general call for papers.
Please send submissions prepared for blind review to [email protected] (as a .pdf file entitled “Naïve Realism workshop submission”). The deadline for submissions is 4 October 2013. Applicants will be notified of the results in early to mid November.
We intend to publish a volume of essays on the motivations for Naïve Realism and Intentionalism, and acceptance of a speaker slot will be regarded as an agreement to reserve a revised version of the presented paper for this volume. The Mind Association has first refusal on the volume for their Occasional Series published by Oxford University Press, in which case the papers will be subject to further peer review (and hence cannot be guaranteed publication).