Panpsychism, Russellian monism and the nature of the physical

It seems that physics can only tell us about the relational or dispositional structure of the physical. Fundamental physical properties such as spin, mass and charge can be exhaustively characterized in terms of their relations to other fundamental properties. But there is reason to think that relations need relata with intrinsic properties, and dispositions need categorical grounds. What can we say about this aspect of the physical, if physics is silent about it? Some hope that a scientific revolution could eventually give us access to physical intrinsic properties; others think we will always remain ignorant about them. But some suggest that we should consider the fact that mental properties are intrinsic and categorical, and are in fact the only such properties we know with certainty to exist. Could mental properties be the intrinsic ground of everything physical? This is what Russellian monist panpsychism affirms. This conference will explore the details and motivations of this radical metaphysical view.

Attendance is free and all are welcome, but please register by email: [email protected]