Certain and uncertain inference with indicative conditionalsnull, Paul Egré (École Normale Supérieure, Institut Jean Nicod)
Level 4, room 460.4.28
250 Victoria Parade
East Melbourne 3002
Australia
This event is available both online and in-person
Details
In this paper we develop a trivalent semantics for the truth conditions and the probability of the natural language indicative conditional. Our framework rests on trivalent truth conditions first proposed by W. Cooper and yields two logics of conditional reasoning: (i) a logic C of inference from certain premises; and (ii) a logic U of inference from uncertain premises. But whereas C is monotonic for the conditional, U is not, and whereas C obeys Modus Ponens, U does not without restrictions. We show correspondences between trivalent and probabilistic representations of inferences in either case, and we use the distinction between the two systems to cast light, in particular, on McGee's puzzle about Modus Ponens. The result is a unified account of the semantics and epistemology of indicative conditionals that can be fruitfully applied to analyzing the validity of conditional inferences
Registration
No
Who is attending?
No one has said they will attend yet.
Will you attend this event?