Philosophy and the Subpersonal

Recent empirical research on subpersonal psychological processes suggests interesting implications for a number of philosophical questions. This colloquium aims to bring together work addressing these implications, on a range of topics such as:

 ∙ Constraints a scientific understanding of the mind should impose on philosophical theory. 

∙ Ways such constraints ought to contribute to our conception of ourselves as epistemic agents. 

∙ How subpersonal processes contribute to practical agency and moral responsibility. 

∙ The role we should expect higher order mental states to play within our cognitive economy. 

∙ Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate subpersonal influences on judgments—practical or epistemic—when both may be phenomenologically indistinguishable. 

∙ Evaluating beliefs and behaviour known to be influenced by subpersonal processes

The conference will feature 5 invited talks, comments by graduate students, and a panel discussion. Everyone is welcome!