Phenomenal Consciousness in the Physical World

June 2, 2014 - June 4, 2014
Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Science, Charles University, Prague

Conference Centre
Jilská 1
Prague 1
Czech Republic

Sponsor(s):

  • Westonia Charitable Trust

Main speakers:

Sam Coleman
University of Hertfordshire
Katalin Farkas
Central European University
Philip Goff
University of Liverpool
Tomáš Hříbek
Institute of Philosophy, Prague
Patrick Lewtas
American University of Beirut
Michelle Montague
Bristol University
Galen Strawson
University of Reading/University of Texas
Dan Zahavi
University of Copenhagen

Organisers:

James Hill
Charles University, Prague
Jakub Mihálik
Charles University, Prague
Martin Pehal
Charles University, Prague

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Perhaps the most important challenge for contemporary philosophy of mind is to give a satisfactory account of how phenomenal consciousness can belong to the natural world described by the physical sciences, including the brain sciences. This conference has two aims. Firstly it will explore the coherence and plausibility of various non-reductive approaches to this problem—such as panpsychism, neutral monism and emergentism. Secondly it will focus on the character of phenomenal consciousness itself, posing the question of whether there is a distinctive phenomenology of thought.

In keeping with these two aims, the conference will be divided into two sections: “Consciousness and Nature”, and “Cognitive Phenomenology”.

Abstracts are invited of 500-1,000 words for contributions of roughly 30 minutes to either of these two sections. Inquiries and abstracts should be sent to the e-mail address below by January 31st, 2014

[email protected]

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1 person is attending:

Cambridge University

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King's College London

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