Epistemic Accountability

The ‘social turn’ in epistemology has seen a recent explosion of work from philosophers investigating epistemic analogues of what we might call our ‘accountability practices’: holding responsible, blaming, praising, excusing, exempting, forgiving, reconciling, and atoning, among other things, which have traditionally been thought of in primarily moral terms. This workshop aims to bring together philosophers working at the intersection of moral psychology, responsibility, and epistemology, to investigate such practices and their foundations.

The two-day workshop will take place in person in Sydney on August 14 and 15 at The University of Notre Dame, Australia’s Broadway campus. Registration is free.

The Institute for Ethics and Society invites abstracts of up to 500 words, for a presentation of approximately 45 minutes. Abstracts should be emailed to [email protected] by July 7.  Potential topics include, but are not limited to:

• When are people, group agents, or collectives responsible, blameworthy, praiseworthy, or excused for their epistemic conduct? What kinds of responses to epistemic conduct are warranted? How can this be done well or poorly?
• Is 'epistemic accountability' ultimately reducible to moral accountability?
• How are epistemic norms similar to, different from, or related to, moral norms? Does epistemic normativity have a social basis?
• Is the notion of ‘epistemic [x]’ confused? Should we be sceptical of such proposals?
• How should we theorise about epistemic agents, networks, groups, or epistemology more broadly when asking such questions?

 Confirmed Speakers

• Hannah Tierney (UC Davis)
• Mark Alfano (Macquarie)
• Cameron Boult (Brandon/Johannesburg)
• Elise Woodard (King’s College London) and Michael Hannon (Nottingham)  [online presentation]
• Tim Smartt (UNDA)
• Adam Piovarchy (UNDA)

A timetable will be sent out closer to the workshop. To register, please email [email protected] by August 13.