Simon Fraser University Workshop on Luck and Achievements

Knowledge is a cognitive achievement that precludes luck: if you know that p, then you believe truly that p, and it is no lucky accident that you believe truly that p. In this regard, knowledge is not unique. Having a doxastically justified belief is another cognitive achievement that precludes luck: if you have a doxastically justified belief, then you believe what is propositionally justified for you to believe, and it is no lucky accident that you so believe. And performing a morally worthy action is yet another luck-excluding achievement: if your action has moral worth, then you do the right thing, and it is no lucky accident that you do the right thing.

The aim of this workshop is to bring together scholars to discuss central and related issues on luck and on achievements (cognitive, normative, or otherwise) and to present their work in a friendly environment. Questions to be addressed might include (but certainly not limited to):

·      Which kinds of luck are achievement-undermining? Which kinds are not?

·      How do we determine whether a particular kind of luck is achievement-undermining?

·      Does knowledge-undermining luck generalize, such that there are achievement-undermining analogues for other kinds of achievements?

·      How to formulate the anti-luck condition on achievements (either generally or specifically for knowledge, doxastic justification, or moral worth)?

·      Is knowledge a unique kind of luck-excluding achievement? If so, what makes it unique?

·      What role (if any) can proper basing play in eliminating luck from achievements?

Registration:

The workshop is free and open to the public, but attendants are required to register to the workshop email ([email protected]) by November 5, 2024.