CFP: Simon Fraser University Workshop on Luck and Achievements

Knowledge is a cognitive achievement that precludes luck: if you know that p, then you believe truly that p, and it is no lucky accident that you believe truly that p. In this regard, knowledge is not unique. Having a doxastically justified belief is another cognitive achievement that precludes luck: if you have a doxastically justified belief, then you believe what is propositionally justified for you to believe, and it is no lucky accident that you so believe. And performing a morally worthy action is yet another luck-excluding achievement: if your action has moral worth, then you do the right thing, and it is no lucky accident that you do the right thing.

While achievements generally preclude luck, not every kind of luck is achievement-undermining. Duncan Pritchard has made this clear in the case of knowledge. You happen to overhear a student inform another that they’ve secured a copy of the final exam’s answer key. You now believe that the integrity of the final exam has been compromised. You are lucky to have a true belief about the integrity of the final exam: you now know that you need to draft another version. Still, this kind of luck—i.e., luck in the evidence that one possesses—does not undermine the fact that you know that the final exam has been compromised.

The aim of this workshop is to bring together scholars to discuss central and related issues on luck and on achievements (cognitive, normative, or otherwise) and to present their work in a friendly environment. Questions to be addressed might include (but certainly not limited to):

·      Which kinds of luck are achievement-undermining? Which kinds are not?

·      How do we determine whether a particular kind of luck is achievement-undermining?

·      Does knowledge-undermining luck generalize, such that there are achievement-undermining analogues for other kinds of achievements?

·      How to formulate the anti-luck condition on achievements (either generally or specifically for knowledge, doxastic justification, or moral worth)?

·      Is knowledge a unique kind of luck-excluding achievement? If so, what makes it unique?

·      What role (if any) can proper basing play in eliminating luck from achievements?

Keynote speakers:

John Greco, Georgetown University

Duncan Pritchard, University of California, Irvine (joining remotely)

Call for abstracts:

Scholars are invited to submit abstracts (max. 700 words) to the workshop email ([email protected]). Abstracts should be prepared for blind review. Submissions should include the author’s name(s) and academic affiliation(s) in the body of the email. Submission deadline is August 1, 2024. Selected participants will be notified by August 15, 2024.

Structure:

The workshop will be held in person (with the exception of one keynote talk, which will be presented remotely), and will span two days. There will be slots for seven speakers, including two keynotes. Each participant will have a 75-minute time slot and should prepare a 35- to 45-minute talk. The rest of the time will be for Q&A.

Registration:

The workshop is free and open to the public, but attendants are required to register using the workshop email ([email protected]) by November 5, 2024.

Funding:

Participating speakers can expect to have their hotel accommodations covered, as well as dinners on both evenings. Light breakfast will also be offered each morning of the workshop. Participants are strongly encouraged to secure their own travel arrangements, although some funding might be available for participants who require assistance with airfare. Please include in the body of the email whether you will also require travel accommodations.

If you have any question, please feel free to reach out to the workshop organizer at [email protected].