Singular Thought and Perception Workshop

In defending some particular view about the nature of perceptual states (most often naive realism) it is sometimes claimed that perceptual states have a special role to play in the theory of mind: that of making contentful thought possible. There is a related suggestion sometimes made about singular thought: there must be singular thoughts because, without singular thoughts, contentful thought in general would not be possible. Given that a similar grounding role is assigned by some philosophers to perceptual states, and by others to a singular thoughts, we might ask: why are perceptual states rather than singular thoughts, or singular thoughts rather than perceptual states, distinctively fit to play the role of making contentful thought possible? The role of this workshop is to address this and closely related questions about the role of, and relationship between, singular thought and perception.

There is no cost to attend the workshop, but registration is required. Please email [email protected] to register.

Contact Rachel Goodman ([email protected]) with questions.

This workshop is sponsored by the Nature of Representation project, a five year research project on the metaphysics and epistemology of mental and linguistic representaion, funded by the European Research Council and headed by Professor Robbie Williams.