Reductionism in metaphysics, meta-ethics, and the philosophy of mind
Fribourg University (TBD)
Fribourg
Switzerland
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Talks at this conference
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Speakers and talk titles:
Mark Johnston. Title TBD.
Tim Crane. ‘Reduction as Explanation’
Anandi Hattiagnadi & Alex Moran: ‘Moral Supervenience and Grounding Laws Contingentism’.
Singa Behrens. 'Against New Explanationism'.
Gideon Rosen. 'Metaethical Non-Naturalism and Mind-Body Dualism: Analogies and Differences.
James van Cleve: Reduction vs Emergence in Metaphysics and Mind'
Damien Aleksiev. 'Inconceivability as a Guide to Ground'
Karen Bennett. Title TBD.
Adam Pautz. 'Varieties of Ground Physicalism: Plenitude vs Special Properties'
Umrao Sethi. 'Mind-Dependence, Reduction and the Sensible Qualities'
Fatema Amijee. 'Egalitarianism about Funadmentality'
Selim Berker. 'Ground as Metaphysical Forces: A Critique'
Ralf Bader: Title TBD.
If you wish to attend the conference, please send an email to [email protected]
The conference focuses on the concepts of reduction and anti-reduction in three philosophical areas: metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and meta-ethics. Some central questions we hope to pursue are these:
(1) What is the right way to understand the concepts of reduction and anti-reduction in philosophy? What is the right metaphysical account of these notions and of the distinction itself?
(2) How do the notions of reduction and anti-reduction apply to key debates in the philosophy of mind and meta-ethics? In what ways does shedding light on the notion of reduction and anti-reduction help to advance ongoing debates in this area and frame new research questions for the future?
(3) What are the relationships, in particular the parallels and differences, between the ways in which the question of reduction and anti-reduction applies to consciousness and moral facts? What can those working in the philosophy of mind, working on (ir)reducibility of consciousness learn from debates in meta-ethics about the (ir)reducibility of value, and vice versa?
Debates about reduction and anti-reduction are as fundamental in philosophy as they are ubiquitous. It is therefore of central importance to philosophy to get clear on the real nature of reduction/anti-reduction—on what it is to reduce one fact, property or theory to another, and on what the distinction between a reductive and a non-reductive theory or approach amounts to. In other words, it is of crucial importance to arrive at a metaphysical account of reduction and anti-reduction, and this is one of the key aims of the conference.
In addition, the conference will also engage with two central areas of philosophical inquiry where questions of reduction/anti-reduction loom large, namely the philosophy of mind and meta-ethics. In the philosophy of mind, one central question is the question of physicalism: can facts about consciousness and mentality be reduced to certain more basic physical facts, concerning for our example our brains and nervous systems? In meta-ethics, one central question is the question of naturalism: can moral facts be reduced to certain more basic natural facts, concerning for example the actions of human beings and their effects? These two questions are structurally analogous, however, they have, for the most part, not been systematically connected and compared. A central goal of the conference is to bring together researchers from these different areas to establish dialogues and allow them to learn from each other, so as to get a better understanding of the relationship between the (ir)reducibility of consciousness and the (ir)reducibility of moral facts.
The conference will also influence philosophical areas further afield. Questions of reduction arise in a wide range of areas, including for instance the philosophy of biology and mathematics. In the philosophy of mathematics, one central question is whether mathematical facts can be ‘reduced’ to certain more basic facts concerning logic, for instance, or set theory. In the philosophy of biology, we ask whether biological processes, including biological life itself, are reducible to certain more basic chemical processes. Gaining a clearer understanding of the metaphysics of reduction and anti-reduction will also help us to advance debates and to frame research questions in these other philosophical areas.
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June 22, 2025, 9:00am CET
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