Knowledge Downstream

Yuri Cath (La Trobe University)

Abstract: What distinguishes a mere true belief from genuine knowledge? A multitude of answers have been given to this question, but almost all of them share a key feature in common, namely, that the further conditions one must meet to possess knowledge are  ‘upstream’ conditions to do with the causal and/or rational origins of one’s belief state (e.g., that it was the output of a reliable belief forming process, or that it was not subject to Gettier-style luck, or that it was based on good evidence). Alternatively, in this talk I will develop a view according to which the conditions that distinguish mere true belief from knowledge are ‘downstream conditions’ to do with whether one’s true belief entails the possession of relevant dispositional states and abilities. The motivation for this approach comes from reflecting on debates about forms of knowledge and understanding—especially, practical knowledge (‘knowing-how’), understanding (esp. ‘understanding-why’), and experiential knowledge (‘knowing what it is like’)—that are often thought to be irreducible to propositional knowledge (‘knowing-that’). I will show how we can offer an attractive account both of what differentiates and what unifies these different forms of knowledge/understanding, by viewing them all as distinct species of downstream knowledge. I will also argue that various distinctions made between these different forms of knowledge/understanding on the one hand, versus knowing-that on the other, are best recast in terms of a distinction between downstream versus upstream knowledge.

Join Zoom meeting:

https://monash.zoom.us/j/86351045263?pwd=1gHMLhmDnXiFJIV0Jl8s6GxhgBgylb.1 

Meeting ID: 863 5104 5263 // Passcode: 184791