Three Kinds of Metaphysical Indeterminacy
Lisa Vogt (University of Geneva)

part of: Advances in Truthmaker Semantics 2
July 30, 2025, 2:15pm - 3:45pm
Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich

Carl-Friedrich-von-Siemens Foundation
Südliches Schlossrondell 23 80638
Germany

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Sponsor(s):

  • The Siemens Foundation
  • The Humboldt Foundation
  • New York University
  • Syracuse University

Organisers:

Syracuse University
Johns Hopkins University
New York University
New York University
Nottingham University
Syracuse University

Details

This talk distinguishes between three different kinds of indeterminacy in the world and shows how they can be modeled within a unified framework in truthmaker-semantics: indeterminacy as fundamental incompleteness, indeterminacy as fundamental indecision, and merely derivative indeterminacy. As we will see, for any putative case of metaphysical indeterminacy, the resulting overall picture and the incurred metaphysical commitments differ substantially depending on which kind of metaphysical indeterminacy is used to understand the case. Modeling these distinctions allows us to acquire a more nuanced picture of the structure of indeterminacy and helps us to get clearer on the question of whether we should understand worldly indeterminacy as a phenomenon that concerns primarily the fundamental level.

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