Traditional compatibilism revisitedMarkus Schlosser
R12 S03 H20
According to traditional
compatibilism (about free will), the ability to do otherwise can be
analysed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. This is known as the
conditional analysis. It is widely believed, even among compatibilists,
that traditional compatibilism is a dead horse, as it were. One of the
main reasons for this is that the conditional analysis is thought to be
subject to decisive counterexamples. In this paper, I will defend
traditional compatibilism against this objection. I will propose a
revised version of the conditional analysis that preserves the core of
traditional compatibilism, and I will argue that this account avoids the
counterexamples. Further, I will explain how compatibilists can use the
conditional analysis in order to respond to the consequence argument
for incompatibilism (van Inwagen 1983).
van Inwagen, P. (1983), An Essay on Free Will. Oxford UP.