How to Believe a Conditional

Hugh Mellor (Cambridge University), Matthew Simpson (Cambridge University)

Tues 27 May, 5.15pm Room 243, second floor, Senate House, WC1
Hugh Mellor (Cambridge)

How to Believe a Conditional

Abstract: We defend the theory that to believe 'If P, Q' is to be disposed to infer Q from P. We present this as an extension of the functionalism that defines beliefs by (a) their perceptual causes, (b) the actions they combine with desires to cause, and (c) their interactions with each other and with desires. We show how this theory distinguishes material from hypothetical conditionals, and explains how, for the latter, 'if P, Q' can be true and 'If not-Q, not-P' false. We conclude by using the theory's account of believing that all Fs are G's - as being disposed to believe of any F that it's G - to account for the belief that there are some Fs (that are G).'

Free entrance. Anyone wishing to join both speakers for a drink after the talk, please let Maruricio Suarez know on: [email protected]