Does Hyperintensionality Earn Its Keep?

October 1, 2026 - October 2, 2026
St John's College, University of Oxford

Mark Bedingham Room, Library and Study Centre
St John's College
Oxford ox1 3jp
United Kingdom

Sponsor(s):

  • C-FORS: Construction in the Formal Sciences, University of Oslo
  • St John's College, University of Oxford

Speakers:

University of Geneva
University College London
University of Oxford
Universität Hamburg
University of Oslo
University of Texas at Austin
London School of Economics
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Princeton University
University of Vienna
University of Oxford

Organisers:

University of Oxford
University of Oslo
University of Texas at Austin

Topic areas

Talks at this conference

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Details

Intensionalists claim that necessarily equivalent propositions are identical; hyperintensionalists deny this. Whereas possible worlds semantics provides a canonical intensionalist framework, there is no canonical hyperintensionalist framework. Recent years have rather seen a thousand flowers bloom with the  development of truthmakers semantics, aboutness theory, grounding theory, and logics of essence, to mention but a few hyperintensionalist theories. 

A lot of recent work has focused on various paradoxes that threaten hyperintensionalism - the so-called Russell-Myhill paradox in particular. We now have reason to think that these paradoxes can be resolved. 

The mere consistency of hyperintensionalist theories does not, obviously, mean that they are worth having. Even staunch adherents of hyperintensionalists approaches would admit that they are more complicated than their intensionalist competitors. So, what work can be done by hyperintensionalists theories that cannot be done by their intensionalist competitors? Is the work being done worth the price of the greater complexity? The goal of the workshop is to bring together some leading proponents and opponents of hyperintensionalism to discuss these questions.

The workshop will be held at St John's College, Oxford, 1-2 OCtober 2026.

Registration is now closed. If you have not registered and would like to attend, please contact Nicholas Jones.

Schedule

1 October

09.25-09.30: Welcome

09.30-10.45: Introductory remarks (Jones, Linnebo, Litland)

10.45-11.00: coffee break

11.00-12.15: Rosen, "Worldly Hyperintensionality and the Metaphysics of Explanation"

12.15-1.30: lunch

1.30-2.45: Ditter , "Non-Naturalism, Supervenience, and Essentialism about Modality"

2.45-3.00: break

3.00 - 4.15: Moltmann, "Object-Based Truthmaker Semantics and the Generation of Modal Objects"

4.15-4.45: coffee & cake break

4.45 - 6.00: Correia, “Factual Equivalence, Its Logic, and Higher-Order Identity”

2 October

09.30-10.45: Williamson, "Semantically Complex Directly Referential Expressions"

10.45-11.00: coffee break

11.00-12.15: Mahtani, "Hyperintensionality and Action-Guiding Principles"

12.15-1.30: lunch

1.30-2.45: Jones or Litland (TBC)

2.45-3.00: break

3.00 - 4.15: Krämer, "Intensional Ground?"

4.15-4.45: coffee & cake break

4.45 - 6.00: Schnieder (TBC)

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Registration

Yes

September 17, 2026, 9:00am BST

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Who is attending?

4 people are attending:

University of Oxford
(unaffiliated)
and 2 more.

1 person may be attending:

University of Vienna

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