Forms of Knowledge in Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein’s work is permeated by investigations into the forms and structures of human knowledge: our propositional knowledge of facts articulated in meaningful sentences, the unarticulated and inarticulable know-how of our language games, the “Now I know!” of rule-following, my practical knowledge of what I want, intend, and do, the “knowledge what it’s like” of lived experience, my second-person knowledge of the mental states of others, the inescapable certainties of our forms of life that are beyond doubt. How these forms of knowledge are constitutively distinct from and yet mutually dependent on one another is the theme of the 8th Wittgenstein Forum of the International Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. How do the diverse language games of knowledge relate to one another, how are they interconnected? How are different forms of knowledge acquired and transmitted, in what ways do they manifest themselves, and how can they be questioned, doubted, and developed? The presentations at the forum are intended as contributions to a perspicuous presentation of the grammar of knowledge according to Wittgenstein.