"The Perceived Role Of Consciousness In Moral Status Attributions"

Rony Hirshhorn, Nicoolò Negro, Liad Mudrik (Tel Aviv University)

Season 4 of the "value of consciousness" zoom series starts Tuesday. The first talk by Rony Hirshhorn, Nicoolò Negro, and Liad Mudrik on "The Perceived Role Of Consciousness In Moral Status Attributions"; more info below. Everybody's welcome. 

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When: Tuesday, Sept. 1st, 11am in Houston/19.00 in Tel Aviv

Where: https://riceuniversity.zoom.us/j/95097231463?pwd=MJPessWBzOphk7kDax5u6D2NpiB6In.1

Who: Rony Hirshhorn, Nicoolò Negro, and Liad Mudrik

What: "The Perceived Role Of Consciousness In Moral Status Attributions"  

Abstract. Determining which entities deserve moral consideration is crucial to policy debates about animal welfare and artificial intelligence regulation. A common assumption is that consciousness is a key criterion for moral status, often considered to be necessary or sufficient for it. However, it is unclear whether public attitudes share this assumption. In a large, preregistered study (N=1493), we tested the perceived relationship between consciousness and moral status by triangulating direct questions, moral dilemmas, and attribution questions across diverse entities. Although consciousness was strongly associated with moral status, it was neither perceived as necessary nor sufficient: participants attributed moral status without consciousness, and denied moral status despite its presence. Moreover, respondents clustered into distinct decision profiles, which were predicted by their individual backgrounds. Therefore, moral decisions did not depend solely on the properties of the target entity, but also on those of the person making the judgment. These results have implications for how ethical and policy decisions are framed.

Schedule for the rest of the year:  

Oct. 6: Juliette Vazard, "Daydreaming your Future"

Nov. 10: Jacopo Pallagrosi, “Introspective Acquaintance and Cognitive Achievement”

Dec. 1: Marybel Menzies, “Phenomenal Perfection” 

Jan. 5 Andreas Mogensen, “Might it not matter whether software can be sentient?" 

Feb. 2 Julien Bugnon and Martine Nida-Rümelin, “Conscious Beings as Centers of Value”

Mar. 2 Tricia Magalotti, “The Value of Emotional Experience”

Apr. 6 Luke Roelofs, “Pluribus and the ethics of hiveminds”

May 4 Robbie Kubala, “Consciousness Aesthetics without Aesthetic Properties”