Minimal Mindreading

Classical explanations of social cognition assume that complex social interaction involves social understanding and that social understanding in turn depends on the ability to read others’ minds, i.e. on the ability to attribute mental states, such as beliefs and desires, to others for the purposes of predicting and explaining their behavior. However, recent findings regarding the social cognitive abilities of infants and animals call into question the claim that such explanations provide a complete picture of social cognition.

In this interdisciplinary workshop we want to discuss findings that might speak against a classical understanding of social cognitive capacities and consider alternative attempts at explanation. Our focus lies in particular on minimal mindreading accounts, such as the one recently proposed by Butterfill and Apperly (Apperly & Butterfill 2009; Apperly 2011; Butterfill & Apperly 2013). Questions that arise concern, among other things, the scope of minimal and full-blown mindreading capacities, their interrelation, and the relation of human and non-human social capacities as well as of infant and adult capacities.