Experts in a Post-Truth World: A Potential Case for Epistemic Injustice

Alexandra De Las Mercedes Benitez (Florida International University)

This session will be part of ‘Truth, Democracy, and Misinformation’, the 20206 Symposium of the Australian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics.

The AAAPE exists to promote awareness of applied ethics and foster relationships between practitioners and academics.

The event will be held on online. The event is free for members and ticketed for non-members. More information, including the full program, schedule, and registration is available at: https://events.humanitix.com/aapae-misinformation-workshop

Expertise is not unlike privilege; it is a power that relies on the social context in which it develops. Understandably, and for this reason, it is hard to imagine those traditionally regarded as experts being collectively undermined. This paper will establish that if expert standing continues to be undermined in a post-truth era, the epistemic injustice field must evolve to include a new species of discrediting to account for the phenomenon.

To justify this as plausible, I first explore the crumbling stature of experts in a post-truth environment. Their standing has been a source of power, offering credibility, resources, and opportunities for mobility to its members. However, their influence is increasingly distinct and relevant only to those on the inside due to the following challenges. The social context acting as a vehicle has suddenly moved in a way that defies expectations- expertise is no longer a mark of being dominantly situated, but a signal to powerful dissenters that these individuals deserve to be relentlessly undermined only for their belonging to an epistemic community.

Then,  I will explain the harm unique to them that arises from their inability to express the epistemic virtues of humility and honesty. I will demonstrate that experts are distinct from knowledgeable non-experts via these two virtues, which contribute to the integrity of their discipline, where knowledge acquired for amusement is no more than a pastime. While both can yield excellence, only one affords authority through relevant virtues, experience, and access to resources. Most importantly, this will show that preventing experts from exercising their epistemic virtues (by their environment's alienating them from their impact) harms them as knowers. These, in my view, are the most important to join, as they facilitate open, willful exchanges that best approximate impartiality. In other words, what non-experts cannot rationally commit to when offered a platform to use or consume.

We must also consider how, in moving towards or existing in a post-truth time, authoritative demands prevail, and we find individuals without expertise censoring expert opinions. Further, expert attention has become a resource forced to address controversial topics. However, when non-experts engage with experts in these discussions, it can create the impression that both parties are equally qualified to discuss or define the relevant concepts.

     Therefore, I argue that a hermeneutical injustice can occur when identity-reliant and contextually-reliant discrediting are conflated, granted that conditions enable experts to be harmed as knowers without suffering prejudice. Thus, avoiding the dismissal of these costly issues as mere conceptual gaps amid rapidly evolving social challenges and technological advancements.

Alexandra De Las Mercedes Benitez’s education is distinctly Miamian, as an alumna of both Florida International University and the University of Miami. She currently serves as an adjunct lecturer at the former and at Miami Dade College. Her research interests in social epistemology, ethics, and feminism are motivated by long-standing and rapidly evolving concerns in these areas, which face challenges posed by technology.